

**CALL FOR PRESENTATIONS**  
*APPEL A COMMUNICATIONS*

**THE RISE OF  
ASIA IN GLOBAL  
HISTORY AND  
PERSPECTIVE:**

*LA MONTÉE DE  
L'ASIE EN  
HISTOIRE ET  
PERSPECTIVE  
MONDIALES :*



Picture taken  
from PICASSO:  
*Circle of Friendship*,  
drawing for the 8th World  
Festival of Youth, Helsinki, August 1962.

**What Challenges and What  
Perspectives for Progressing  
Globally towards a Sustainable  
Prosperity in Peace, Justice,  
Cooperation, Diversity and  
Solidarity?**



International and  
Interdisciplinary  
Conference  
Paris and Le Havre,  
February 21-23, 2024

*Quels défis et quelles perspectives  
pour progresser mondialement vers  
une prospérité durable en paix,  
justice, coopération, diversité et  
solidarité ?*

**FORTHCOMING / A VENIR**  
**February 21-23 / 2024 / 21-23 février**



# THE RISE OF ASIA IN GLOBAL HISTORY AND PERSPECTIVE LA MONTEE DE L'ASIE EN HISTOIRE ET PERSPECTIVE GLOBALES

## What Challenges and What Perspectives for Progressing Globally towards a Sustainable Prosperity in Peace, Justice, Cooperation, Diversity and Solidarity?

### INTERNATIONAL AND INTERDISCIPLINARY CONFERENCE

Paris, February 21, 2024

Le Havre, February 22-23, 2024

<https://bandungspirit.org/>

### CALL FOR PAPERS AND FOR PARTICIPATION

The conference is open to individual and group paper presentations. Those willing to present their papers are invited to submit their proposals until December 31, 2023. The selected proposals will be communicated to their authors progressively according to their availability from September 2023. The earlier the abstracts are submitted, the sooner the authors will get notified. See the GUIDELINES FOR PRESENTER CANDIDATES below.

#### OFFLINE AND ONLINE PARTICIPATION

The conference will be organised offline (physically) and possibly online (virtually), following the circumstances. Priority will be given to offline (physical) participants.

### INTRODUCTION

That Asia is rising was recognised progressively, starting from around two decades ago, as was stated in the books of, for example, Frank B. Tipton (*The Rise of Asia: Economics, Society, and Politics in Contemporary Asia*, 1998), Kishore Mahbubani (*New Asian Hemisphere: The Irresistible Shift of Global Power to the East*, 2008), Terutomo Ozawa (*The rise of Asia: The 'flying-geese' theory of tandem growth and regional agglomeration*, 2009) or Parag Khanna (*The future is Asian: Commerce, Conflict, and Culture in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, 2019). The start of rising however had taken place earlier, at least a half-century ago, around 1970, as was demonstrated convincingly by Deepak Nayyar in his two complementary books: *Asian Transformation: An Inquiry into the Development of Nations* and *Resurgent Asia: Diversity in Development* (2019).

What was known largely by scholars about Asia for a long time, at least during the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, was the magisterial work of Gunnar Myrdal "Asian Drama" (*Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations*, 1968). The author, Swedish economist, Nobel Prize of economy in 1974, was deeply pessimistic about the development prospects in Asia. His feeling was confirmed by the fact that Asia was the poorest continent of the world in 1970. Fifty years later, the facts are completely different. By 2016 Asia accounted for 30% of world income, 40% of world manufacturing, and one-third of world trade, while its income per capita converged to the world average. Deepak Nayyar and his team analysed this phenomenal transformation.

The work of Gunnar Myrdal was focused on South Asia (India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka) and in less degree Southeast Asia (Burma, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, South Vietnam) with a historical perspective limited to post-colonial era. Moreover, a large part of Asia was excluded from his study (Japan, Korea, China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, West Asia, Central Asia). Yet, the author called his work "Asian" Drama, which is an exaggerated generalisation. For Deepak Nayyar, *Asian Drama* represents "a largely Western perspective, even if it was through a Nordic lens. It did not quite recognize that the observed backwardness and underdevelopment of Asia might have been a consequence of colonialism, or that Asia and Europe might have been similar in terms of their levels of development in the mid-eighteenth century." (Resurgent Asia, p. 8). In the perspective of Samir Amin's *Eurocentrism*, *Asian Drama* may be an example of an "eurocentric work" (Samir Amin, *Eurocentrisme*, 1978).

In contrast, the work of Deepak Nayyar covers almost the whole Asia. It disaggregates Asia into its four constituent sub-regions – East, Southeast, South, and West Asia – and further into fourteen selected countries, described as the Asian-14: China, India, South Korea, Indonesia, Turkey, Taiwan, Thailand, Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Vietnam and Sri Lanka. These countries account for more than four-fifths of the population and income of Asia. Moreover, the study covers a longer historical perspective, including the colonial period, starting from 1820, when Asia started to decline.

In 1820, Asia accounted for two-thirds of world population and almost three-fifths of world income. The colonial era witnessed a precipitous decline in this economic significance. By 1962, the share of Asia in world population diminished to 50 per cent, while its share of world income plummeted to 15 per cent. For China and India, taken together, these shares plunged to 35 per cent and 8 per cent respectively. Income per capita in Asia, as a proportion of that in the West, dropped from one-half in 1820 to less than one-tenth in 1962. Western Europe produced manufactured goods while Asia produced primary commodities. Consequently, the share of China and India in world manufacturing production collapsed from 47 per cent in 1830 to 5 per cent in 1963. The decline and fall of Asia was attributable to its integration with the world economy, through trade and investment, shaped by colonialism and driven by imperialism. The industrialization of Western Europe and the deindustrialization of Asia were, in fact, two sides of the same coin, which had a devastating impact on China and India.

In 1970, Asia was the poorest continent in the world, marginal except for its large population. By 2016, its share of world GDP rose from less than one-tenth to three-tenths, while its income per capita surpassed that of developing countries and converged towards the world average income level. Growth in GDP and GDP per capita in Asia was much higher than in the world economy, industrialized countries, and the developing world, both Africa and Latin America. Over this period, the share of Asia in world industrial production jumped from a miniscule 4 per cent to more than 40 per cent. Its share of world merchandise trade rose from one-twelfth to one-third.

It is necessary to recognize the diversity of Asia. There were marked differences between countries in geographical size, embedded histories, colonial legacies, nationalist movements,

initial conditions, natural resource endowments, population size, income levels, and political systems. The politics, too, ranged widely from socialism through State capitalism to capitalism, from authoritarian regimes to political democracies, and from one-party states to multi-party systems. There were different paths to development, because there were no unique solutions, or magic wands. Hence, there were choices to be made, which were shaped by a complex mix of economic, social and political factors in the national context, where history mattered. Yet, despite such diversity, there are discernible patterns, pointing to substantive analytical lessons that emerge from the Asian development experience.

Is it, then, possible to speculate or hypothesize about the prospects of Asia in the world economy over the next twenty-five years? Long-term macroeconomic forecasts of GDP at market exchange rates, by the Economist Intelligence Unit, suggest that the top ten economies in the world, in 2050, in descending order would be China, United States, India, Indonesia, Japan, Germany, Brazil, Mexico, Britain, and France. (Deepak Nayyar, *Resurgent Asia*).

Beyond the economy, Parag Khanna saw Asia becoming more integrated and moving closer towards a "system". The Asian system does not, and will not, have rules as formalized as those of Europe. There is no supranational Asian parliament, central bank, or military - no "Asian Union". Instead, the Asian approach to integration involves building complementarities and deferring dangerous issues. Fundamentally, Asians seek not conquest but respect. A sufficient degree of respect for one another's interests is enough.

For a long time, many Asian citizens have been fed historical narratives of animosity about their neighbours. Yet, though suspicions and negative stereotypes remain strong - especially between Indians and Pakistanis, Chinese and Japanese, Saudi Arabians and Iranians - Asians are getting to know one another better than ever through diplomacy, business, tourism, student exchanges, and regional media. From Al Jazeera to CCTV, Asian youths are becoming more knowledgeable about their fellow Asians and comfortable with their Asian-ness. Over time, perceptions will shift, interests will align, policies will change, and coordination will deepen. The more Asians socialize with one another, the more confidence they will have in solving their problems together. (p12)

The Asian system has never been an Asian bloc. To the contrary, for most of history, there has been stability across the many Asian sub-regions and fluidity rather than hierarchy. There will be therefore no Chinese unipolarity - neither globally nor even in Asia. Asians are much more comfortable with the idea of global multipolarity than are Americans, for whom recent history (and most scholarship) has focused on unipolar orders - especially their own. But the more multipolar the world becomes, the more the global future resembles Asia's past. (p16).

The biggest geopolitical phenomena of the past three decades have come in rapid succession: the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the consolidation of the European Union, the rise of China, the US shale energy revolution, and now the emergence of an Asian system. Global order is about the distribution of power and how that power is governed. The anchor of global order is not necessarily a single country or a set of values, as was the case with the currently waning Western liberal international order. Instead, the foundations of the emerging global order are the US, European and Asian systems - all at the same time. Each provides vital services around the world, such as military protection, financial investment, and infrastructure development. Rather than one superpower simply fading away to be replaced by a successor, we are living - for the first time ever - in a truly multipolar and multicivilizational order in which North America, Europe, and Asia each represents a major share of power. Asia is not replacing the US or the West-but it is now shaping them as much as they have shaped it. (pp. 13-14)

### **Main questions**

The rising Asia described above raises questions: what are the challenges and what are the perspectives for Asia in particular and for the world in general so that the Rise of Asia will benefit not only Asian peoples but also other peoples of the world; so that the Rise of Asia allows the world to progress together towards a sustainable prosperity in peace, justice, cooperation, diversity and solidarity?

Those questions concern especially but not exclusively following diverse interrelated fields and issues:

- Culture (ethnicity, identity, diversity, language, literature, arts, crafts, gender and women's issues, patriarchy...);
- Ecology (built and natural environment, architecture, urbanisation, ruralisation, climate change, health, demography, migration...);
- Economy (trade, business, crises, e-commerce, cryptocurrency, blockchain, natural resources, human resources...)
- Politics (geopolitics, geoeconomics, political economy, international relations, sovereignty, colonialism-neocolonialism, wars, genocide, armament...);
- Religion (diversity, pluralism, fundamentalism, extremism, communitarianism, gender and women's issues, male domination, tolerance and intolerance...).

It is to discuss about those such questions that the 8<sup>th</sup> edition of the Rise of Asia Conference Series is organised. It encourages the participation of scholars from a wide range of scientific disciplines (area studies, cultural studies, ecology, economics, geography, history, humanities, languages, management, political and social sciences...) and practitioners from diverse professional fields (business, civil society, education, enterprise, government, management, parliament, public policy, social and solidarity movements...) as well as artists and writers, based in diverse geographical areas (Africa, North, Central and South America, Australia, Asia, the Caribbean, Europe, Oceania, Pacific...).

### **GUIDELINES FOR PRESENTER CANDIDATES**

The selection of presenters is based on the abstract and the basic personal data of the presenter candidates in respect to the following dates:

1. Deadline of abstract submission: December 31, 2023
2. Announce of the selected presenters: progressively starting from September 2023. The earlier the abstracts are submitted, the sooner the authors will get notified.
3. Deadline of full paper submission for publication project will be decided following the conference.

Abstracts of approximately 200-300 words (excluding figures, tables, and references) and basic personal data of the authors are to be submitted online at:

<https://forms.gle/6CV2FPAsAT973NRJ6>

### **FINANCING**

In case of physical conference, the organising committee does not provide travel grant to any participant. The presenters as well as participants of the conference are supposed to find the necessary fund for their own participation (visa, international and national transport, accommodation).